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Abstract: The concept of sentience concerns the capacity to have feelings. There is 
evidence for sophisticated cognitive concepts and for both positive and negative feelings 
in a wide range of nonhuman animals. All vertebrates, including fish, as well as some 
molluscs and decapod crustaceans have pain systems. Most people today consider that 
their moral obligations extend to many animal species. Moral decisions about abortion, 
euthanasia, and the various ways we protect animals should take into account the 
research findings about sentience. In addition, all animal life should be respected and 
studies of the welfare of even the simplest invertebrate animals should be taken into 
consideration when we interact with these animals. 
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Why Are We Interested in Sentience? 
 
People have always wondered what is the essential quality that makes us human. We 
have the same basic brain and bodily capabilities as other animals, and observations of 
behavior indicate that many other animals need resources such as air, food, and resting 
places and that they know other individuals have such needs. However, we humans have 
always sought a means of differentiating ourselves, and efforts have been made to 
ascribe unique qualities to ourselves. In human societies, a soul, a psyche, or a spirit has 
been attributed to people, or at least to some people, with the assumption that this 
quality helps to define a human being. However, when defined objectively, each of these 
qualities has components that are also thought of as components of sentience, so soul, 
psyche, or spirit can mean the same as being sentient. Are there any solely human 
qualities? Which humans and which other animals are sentient? The book itself (Broom, 
2014) is the source for the contents of this Précis and is fully referenced so only a few 
key citations are mentioned here. 
 The term “sentience” has generally been used to mean that the individual has the 
capacity to experience one or more of the various states we call “feelings” (DeGrazia, 
1996; Kirkwood, 2006). This capacity involves awareness and cognitive ability, and is 
hence subserved by the brain. A major change in attitudes regarding awareness and 
feelings in humans and other animals has occurred as studies of behavior have become 
more detailed. Complex behavioral sequences can provide evidence for the presence of 
cognitive ability and emotional reactions. In addition, there are new methods that allow 
advances in the study of brain mechanisms, for example, electroencephalography (EEG), 
positron-emission tomography (PET-scanning), magneto-encephalography (MEG), and 
frequency-modulated magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).  
 Sentience implies having a range of abilities, not just feelings. Abilities associated 
with sentience, including some necessary cognitive abilities, are listed below. The 
abilities and the underlying concepts call for both definitions and evidence. A sentient 
being is one that has some ability: to evaluate the actions of others in relation to itself 
and third parties, to remember some of its own actions and their consequences, to 
assess risks and benefits, to have some feelings, and to have some degree of awareness 
(Broom, 2006).  
Which Humans Are Sentient? 
When did humans or their forebears become sentient? The idea that some races of 
people alive today have significant inborn genetic differences in their level of brain 
function is now known to be incorrect. There is also no evidence for differences between 
races in sensory abilities and feelings, for example, the capacity to feel pain. The 
variation of human ability within each race is much greater than the variation across 
races. Similarly, the idea that early humans were primitive in every way and very 
different from modern humans is not supported by written or archaeological evidence.  
 When human cognitive and other abilities are compared with those of other 
species, conclusions have to be qualified in relation to the very young and some of the 
injured or old. At birth, a human child may have the potential to carry out impressive 
cognitive tasks later in life but has far less actual ability than many other animals have. A 
person who has suffered substantial brain damage after an accident or a person with 
advanced senile dementia may be much less able than the companion dog or the magpie 
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in the garden. Sentience is a capacity that normally grows during human development; it 
can also diminish and be lost. The same is true for other sentient species.  
 The concept of sentience is relevant to ethical decisions, for example, about 
abortion, killing young at birth or hatching, and the use of anaesthetics and analgesics. 
We now have much scientific evidence about the development of brain systems in the 
fetuses and newborns of humans and other species, as well as about the loss of function 
following brain pathology. It is clear that, when capabilities are considered, some people 
are sentient but others are not because they have not developed the abilities or have lost 
them. The same is true of other animals. How does this affect our ideas of individual 
value and acceptable treatment? 
Morality and Attitudes to Others 
Moral behavior is a successful strategy used by both human and nonhuman individuals 
living in stable, long-lasting social groups (Kummer, 1978; de Waal, 1996; Broom, 2003). 
The more efficient the information exchange amongst individuals, the more frequently 
moral behavior succeeds and the less frequently competitive behavior that harms others 
will succeed. Cognition, emotion, and awareness all facilitate efficient communication 
and learning about the environment. They also make it easier to identify other sentient 
beings and increase the likelihood that they will be considered the subjects of moral 
actions. In many societies today, educational levels are high and there is easy access to 
information about people in other countries and about animals whose abilities are 
complex. Hence there will be a continuing decline in the likelihood that people will 
cause, or tolerate, poor welfare in foreign people or in animals perceived to be sentient.  
 It is of particular interest that the changes in attitudes to humans and to 
nonhuman animals appear to be linked more closely to the educational level of people 
than to their affluence. In countries where the people are relatively poor, but well-
educated, interest in human and animal welfare has changed in much the same way as in 
rich countries where people are well-educated. The people are willing to incur some 
degree of financial loss rather than benefit from poor welfare in other people or animals. 
 If we use a living animal in a way that gives us some benefit, we have some 
obligations to that animal. One obligation is to avoid causing poor welfare in the animal 
except where the action leads to a net benefit to that animal, or to other animals 
including humans, or to the environment. Such a utilitarian approach is not sufficient to 
determine all obligations, however: A deontological approach is also needed because 
there are some degrees of poor welfare that are never justified by benefit to others. For 
example, research scientists should not tear the limbs off a live cat even if they think that 
key information about curing disease might result from such an action. 
 It is my view that all human behavior and laws should be based on the obligations 
of each person to act in an acceptable way towards each other person and toward each 
animal that is used. It is better for strategies for living to be based on our obligations 
rather than to involve the concept of rights. This is because many “rights” can result in 
harm to others — for example, carrying a lethal weapon or choosing the sex of human 
offspring (Broom, 2003). This argument is also applicable to references to the freedom 
that an individual asserts, or that is supposed to be given to an individual. Each person 
should always focus on how they ought to behave. 
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 The idea that animals used by people should not be treated like inanimate 
possessions and should be protected from actions that might cause suffering is very old 
and widespread in human society. The term sentient is now used in legislation about 
animals. The European Union Treaty of Lisbon (European Union, 2007) says in the 
course of a statement about animal protection and welfare (Article 6b), “since animals 
are sentient beings….” This wording had the intention to protect the animals commonly 
used by humans: for example, on farms, in the laboratory, or as companions. It came 
about because public concern about animal welfare has increased in many countries 
during the last 30 years and especially in the last 10 years.  
 
The Development of Animal Welfare Science 
Scientists and legislators now use animal welfare as a scientific concept describing a 
potentially measurable quality of a living animal at a particular time. Such usage has 
rapidly become widespread during the last 30 years. The author’s definition of the 
welfare of an individual as its state in its attempts to cope with its environment (Broom, 
1986) refers to all coping systems and so includes feelings and health (Dawkins, 2006). 
It is now used by most welfare scientists and is also, somewhat clumsily, used by the 
O.I.E. (World Organization for Animal Health). “Well-being” is the same concept, even if 
viewed as less scientific by many, and “quality of life” refers entirely to welfare but is not 
used for short timescales (Broom, 2007b). It is possible to consider the welfare of all 
animals, not just those who are sentient, but the abilities associated with sentience affect 
welfare. 
 Welfare can be assessed using a wide variety of behavioral, physiological, clinical, 
brain function, and other measures (Fraser, 2008; Broom & Fraser, 2015). It is 
important to assess how good the welfare is as well as to evaluate poor welfare. The 
major changes in animal welfare science during the last 30 years have been the 
refinement in direct measures of animal welfare and the development of welfare 
outcome indicators that can be used by veterinary and other inspectors, as well as by 
those who use animals. Welfare outcome indicators have been developed by many 
scientists, including those involved in the E.U. Welfare Quality and Animal Welfare 
Indicators (AWIN) projects. Information on the subject is available at the Animal 
Welfare Hub (2015). 
 Another key aspect of animal welfare science has been the investigation of 
differences in the needs of different animals (Rollin, 1989; Broom & Johnson, 2000). The 
first step in developing standards for the welfare of animals of a species is to describe 
clearly the needs of such animals. A knowledge of the biological functioning of the 
animal provides some information about needs, but careful studies of the strengths of 
preferences clarify what the animals need (Fraser, 2008). The principles used in these 
studies are those of microeconomics, but the experiments involve animals carrying out 
specific actions to obtain rewards or to avoid aversive effects, and they are based in part 
on the learning and memory abilities of the animals. 
Cognition, Feelings, Awareness and Motivation 
Some feelings require cognitive processes and a certain level of awareness (Mendl & 
Paul, 2004), with some components of sentience being dependent upon cognitive ability. 
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Moral actions are also facilitated by cognitive function. The cognitive abilities of humans 
and other animals depend on the quality of their brain function, but this is often not 
clearly related to brain size, nor are high levels of cognitive ability confined to one kind 
of brain structure. People often assume, incorrectly, that small animals, animals with 
small brains, cold-blooded animals, and animals with brain structures different from 
those of humans cannot have complex concepts and behavior. Much recent research has 
demonstrated that a wide range of animals have substantial cognitive ability, 
irrespective of size. For example, when primate cognition is claimed to be unique in 
some way, there is often subsequent work on other species such as dogs, pigs, corvids, 
and parrots that demonstrates they also have such cognitive capacities (Shettleworth, 
2010).  
 Estimates of brain sophistication should take account of function rather than 
anatomy alone because animals vary in the parts of the brain that have complex 
analytical functions. Although some mammals have high-level functions in the cerebral 
cortex, a comparable level of analysis occurs in areas of the striatum in birds and in a 
variety of brain regions in fish, cephalopods, and other animal groups. The remarkable 
cognitive ability of some spiders is achieved with a small brain, but the processing speed 
during evaluation of complex situations is slower than it would be in a vertebrate brain. 
On the other hand, in some small animals, the rate of change of events in life, and hence 
their speed of decision-making, is greater than that of larger animals like humans. When 
the speed of evaluation of information and responding were compared for humans and 
many other animals, the fastest was that of a blowfly. Anyone who has watched 
hummingbirds taking their daily decisions and reacting to humans is likely to have 
gained the impression that these tiny birds probably view us as slow and hence perhaps 
of little consequence. 
 In recent years there have been many studies of cognitive ability that lead to the 
conclusions that: (a) hardly any ability is uniquely human, (b) the best bird brains allow 
greater cognitive abilities than any mammal except man, (c) learning by fish can be very 
complex, and (d) cognition in cephalopods, jumping spiders, ants, and bees is much 
more sophisticated than we had previously thought. Communicating using symbols is 
possible for many animals, so perhaps human language is not that unique. Using 
information from a mirror has been demonstrated in humans, chimpanzees, capuchin 
monkeys, pigs, elephants, dolphins, parrots, and magpies. The concept of future events is 
evident from work on many farm, companion, and other animals. There have been 
studies indicating capacities for metacognition (i.e. knowing what you know) in humans, 
monkeys and, dolphins. Tool use and other comparably complex innovative behaviors 
have been demonstrated in many species of primates, birds, and fish. 
 Emotion, which has long been viewed as necessarily separate from intellectual 
activity, is now shown to be a facilitator of learning and a consequence of learning (Rolls, 
2005; Paul et al., 2005). Indeed, the evaluation of welfare can make use of this, for 
example, in studies of cognitive bias. All of the terms used to describe affective state, 
such as feelings, emotion, mood, pain, suffering, and pleasure require careful definition. 
For example, a feeling is a brain activity that involves at least perceptual awareness; it is 
associated with a life-regulating system and recognizable by the individual when it 
recurs, and it may change behavior or act as a reinforcer in learning. Feelings, such as 
pain and fear, are now thought to be widespread in mammals, birds, fish, cephalopods 
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and some other molluscs, and in decapod crustacea (Elwood, 2012; Broom, 2013; 
Mather, 2013). 
 There are several levels of awareness in individuals and in different phylogenetic 
groups of animals. Awareness has been categorized as ranging from unawareness to 
perceptual, cognitive, assessment, and executive awareness (Sommerville & Broom, 
1998). A related concept, being conscious, is best considered as just the negation of 
being unconscious rather than as a synonym of awareness. Some key aspects of 
awareness are awareness of the actions of others, of one’s own actions, of the 
interactions between one’s own and others’ actions, of the future, of the self, and of 
others having concepts (Mendl & Paul, 2008). To behave morally, brain functioning 
requires some degree of recognition, awareness, decision-making, and feelings. The 
decision-making depends on the existence of a motivational system. 
Ethical Decisions: Using the Science 
When decisions are made about whether a system for exploiting resources should be 
used, an important question is whether the system is sustainable (Aland & Madec, 
2009). A system or procedure is sustainable if it is acceptable now and if its expected 
future effects are acceptable, in particular in relation to resource availability, 
consequences of functioning, and morality of action (Broom 2010; Broom et al., 2013). 
No system or procedure is sustainable if a substantial proportion of the local or world 
public find aspects of it now unacceptable, or if they consider now that its expected 
consequences in the future are morally unacceptable. More and more people will not 
buy products if their production method is considered unsustainable for any reason.  
 Factors considered by purchasers and high on the agenda of many discriminating 
consumers include (i) the welfare of the animals used in production; (ii) any impact on 
the environment, including conservation of wildlife; (iii) ensuring a fair payment for 
producers, especially in poor countries; (iv) the preservation of rural communities so 
that the people there do not go to live in towns; and (v) the carbon footprint in relation 
to global warming. Each of these factors is now also considered by increasing numbers 
of consumers to be an aspect of product quality.  
 The power of consumers in forcing change where production practices are 
unacceptable (Bennett et al., 2002) has had a great impact in changing laws, codes of 
practice, and food company policies in relation to farming practices. Examples of 
practices that lead to particularly poor welfare in farm animals and are already illegal or 
being phased out in many countries are confinement of pregnant sows or calves in small 
stalls or crates, keeping hens in battery cages, keeping mink or foxes in small barren 
cages, and transport conditions that cause suffering. Practices where change is likely to 
be mandatory in the near future are (i) the keeping of meat chickens using growth rates 
that result in a high incidence of leg disorders and skin lesions and (ii) selecting cows for 
high milk production with the consequence that there is a high incidence of leg 
disorders, mastitis, and reproductive disorders. Consumers have also had an impact on 
the banning of products to stop the use of leg-hold and other inhumane traps for wild 
mammals, inhumane killing of young seals, killing of whales, and the nonmedical use of 
genetically modified or cloned animals. 
 Scientific information about which individuals are sentient, and how good or 
poor is the welfare of the individual, inform some ethical decisions (Broom, 2007a). 
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There is a widespread desire for most people and certain nonhuman animals to be 
specially protected, either because they are considered to have some intrinsic value or 
because it is considered wrong for their welfare to be poor. In deciding whether the 
killing of a human embryo is justified, whether a brain-damaged or senile person should 
be allowed to die, which animals should be killed for human use, and for which animals 
we have concern about welfare, many people take account of the cognitive and 
emotional functioning of the individual. The question of the sentience of the individual is 
important in such decisions.  
 Which animals should be protected? Should the range of protected animals be 
limited to warm-blooded animals or vertebrate animals, or should it be extended to any 
of the invertebrate groups? Should protection begin at the point of formation of egg or 
sperm or zygote, on hatching from an egg or birth in the case of mammals, or should it 
begin at some point during fetal or embryonic development (EFSA, 2005)? At what point 
in development should there be protection, and in practice, immature forms of which 
kinds of animals could be protected? Does sentience mean that the individual has 
interests?  
 What follows is a list of conclusions about what should be done in relation to 
studies of sentience and the treatment of humans and other animals. 
1. When investigating brain and behavior in humans and other animals, 
academics should use precise scientific methodology to describe observations, to 
experiment, to analyze results, and to write about them, but they should not be 
afraid to use concepts such as emotion, feeling, mood, pain, fear, happiness, 
awareness, consciousness, stress, need, and welfare in presenting results. No 
concept should be avoided because there may be those who would criticize the 
use of complex concepts on the grounds that there must be parsimony in all 
descriptions. If the subject is complex, some of the concepts must be complex. 
2. Each concept used in research on cognition, awareness, and animal welfare 
should be properly defined in scientific writing rather than just being referred to 
in descriptive but imprecise ways.  
3. It is possible to take account of sentience when considering whether abortion 
is acceptable. The fetus during pregnancy has a potential, increasing with time, of 
becoming a sentient individual. This argument is correct for humans and other 
sentient animals. However, the point at which the developing human fetus has 
the capacity for having feelings and being aware is about 60% through 
pregnancy. This corresponds to the age at which survival is possible. 
4. The word “euthanasia”, which means a good death, should be used solely to 
mean killing an individual for the benefit of that individual. If the benefit is for 
someone else, it should be called killing or humane killing but not euthanasia. 
Euthanasia in humans is not legal in most countries, in particular because of 
difficulties in formulating a law that would not allow the possibility that elderly 
people may be encouraged to agree to hasten their deaths. However, in public 
discussions about the subject, it is often stated that the expectation of loss of 
sentience may be a reason a person would request euthanasia for themselves. 
When a companion animal is suffering, the caregiver may decide that it would be 
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better for that animal to be dead than to continue suffering. It is assumed that the 
animal is sentient and would prefer not to suffer further. 
5. An ability in individuals of a species does not necessarily mean that all 
members of the species have the ability; however, the level of complexity of 
functioning of the animal should be taken into account when designing housing 
and husbandry systems for the species. Careful studies of animal welfare are 
required for this. 
6. High levels of cognitive ability may help animals to cope with their 
environment. Hence a given level of a problem, such as pain, may be easier for a 
complex animal to tolerate than for a simpler animal. There is a possibility that 
animals may have fear of possible future adversity. The relationships between 
negative feelings, such as fear and pain, and the role of cognition in the coping 
abilities of the animal should be investigated further and considered when 
evaluating the risk of poor welfare. Cognitive ability should also be considered 
when designing methods of enriching the environments of captive animals. 
7. A substantial body of research on parrots, dogs, pigs, cattle, and other farm 
animals and companion animals shows that they have some ability for 
recognition, cognition, risk assessment, cognitive awareness, assessment 
awareness, emotions, and feelings and hence that they are sentient.  Research on 
laboratory and wild mammals and birds is providing similar evidence. In 
particular, studies of birds in the crow family provide evidence of high levels of 
cognitive ability and awareness. 
8. The information about learning, awareness, and capacity for pain and other 
feelings in amphibians, reptiles, fish, cephalopods, and decapod crustaceans is 
also clear enough to justify arguments for their protection if they are used in 
experimentation, for food, or for other purposes. Learning and awareness in 
stomatopod crustaceans is at least equivalent to that in decapod crustaceans. 
9. Spiders have substantial cognitive ability and perhaps executive awareness; 
and some insects such as bees and ants have quite a high level of cognitive ability 
and probably assessment awareness. There is clear evidence for aspects of a pain 
system in gastropod molluscs, such as snails, slugs, and swimming sea slugs, but 
we cannot be sure that they have the processing capacity needed to feel pain. 
Because some aspects of the pain system exist in leeches and swimming sea slugs, 
these animals are used as models for human pain. Evidence for a pain system is 
significantly less for insects and spiders than it is for molluscs. Cognitive ability 
and awareness in gastropod molluscs have not been shown to be as great as they 
are in spiders or insects. There is a case for some degree of protection for spiders, 
gastropods, and insects. However, the case is not as strong as the one for 
vertebrates, cephalopods, and decapod crustaceans. 
10. All animal life should be respected, and studies of the welfare of even the 
simplest invertebrate animals should be taken into account when we interact 
with these animals. Even if we do not protect the animals by law, we should try to 
avoid cutting an earthworm in half, mutilating a snail, or damaging the wing of an 
insect. 
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Summary 
When scientists describe a complex system like the brain, terms such as awareness, 
sentience, welfare, emotion, and feeling should be carefully defined and used. If they are 
not used, important aspects of biological function are missed. The reluctance of some in 
the scientific community to do this has slowed the development of knowledge. 
 The concept of sentience, which concerns the capacity to feel, has some parallels 
with ideas of the soul or psyche that have often been used to propose that humans are 
fundamentally different from other animals. There is evidence for sophisticated 
cognitive concepts and for both positive and negative feelings in a wide range of 
nonhuman animals. Are primates more advanced than other mammals, are bird brains 
second-rate, and are farm animals stupid? The cognitive capacities of parrots and 
corvids are comparable with — or even better than — those of apes. Cows, pigs, and 
sheep are better in some abilities than dogs, cats, and horses. Studies of spiders and 
cephalopods indicate impressive brain function. All vertebrates, including fish, as well as 
some molluscs and decapod crustaceans, have pain systems. In addition, the points at 
which sentience arises in human embryos and disappears in brain-damaged people need 
to be considered. 
 The concept of animal welfare is relevant to all animals, and animal welfare 
science has developed rapidly. The results of such research are being used when laws 
and standards are designed and adopted because, for an increasing proportion of the 
public, animal welfare is coming to be regarded as an important factor in the 
sustainability of systems and the quality of animal products.  
 Most people now consider that their moral obligations extend to many animal 
species. Moral decisions about abortion, euthanasia, and the various ways in which we 
protect animals should take account of information about sentience. All animal life 
should be respected and studies of the welfare of even the simplest invertebrate animals 
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The Israel Journal of Ecology and Evolution is seeking manuscript submissions for a special edition on 
Compassionate Conservation. Guest editors are Drs. Dror Ben-Ami and Daniel Ramp. They are inviting 
original research that is exemplary of Compassionate Conservation values. Compassionate Conservation 
builds the welfare of individual wildlife into conservation practice to improve outcomes for individuals, 
species and ecosystems. It has four guiding principles: a commitment to doing no harm as a starting point 
for intervention, individuals matter, all wildlife are worthy of conservation, and peaceful coexistence should 
be the ultimate aim for conservation practice. Practical examples include non-lethal management of wildlife 
populations, including animal welfare in conservation solutions, non-invasive monitoring techniques for 
studying wildlife, and engagement of human communities to minimise human-wildlife conflict. 
 
For more information please contact Daniel Ramp at Daniel.Ramp@uts.edu.au 
 
